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THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECTOGENETIC
RESEARCH
Kevin Abel
The really revolutionary revolution is to be achieved, not in
the external world, but in the souls and flesh of human beings.
Aldous Huxley
INTRODUCTION
In 1961, Dr. Daniele Petrucci of the University of Bologna, Italy,
was conducting experiments in human ectogenesis, the in vitro' fertili-
zation and gestation of a fetus.2 Dr. Petrucci had succeeded in nutur-
ing from fertilization a human embryo for twenty-nine days; then he
detected abnormalities in the embryo and "terminated" the experi-
ment.3 In another effort, Petrucci succeeded in sustaining an ecto-
genetic embryo for almost two months;4 it died due to a laboratory mis-
take.5 When word of Dr. Petrucci's experiments reached the Italian
public it created a furor.6 Petrucci was blasted by civic leaders and
the Vatican. 7 Demands were even made that the doctor be prosecuted
for murder. 8 At last, weary of public and Church criticism and fearful
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICToNARY 1190 (3rd ed. 1961).
2. Man into Superman, TIME 38, 51 (Ap. 19, 1971); Smith, Through a Test
Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MicH. L. REv. 127, 127 (1968);
Rosenfeld, The New Man, LIFE 98 (Oct. 1, 1965); Baby in a Bottle, AMERICW 560
(Jan. 28, 1961); Test Tube Tempest, NEWSWEEK 78 (Feb. 6, 1961); NEWSWEEK
73 (Mar. 6, 1961).
3. See articles cited note 2 supra.
4. To be exact, 59 days. Man into Superman, supra note 2; Rosenfeld, The New
Man, supra note 2.
5. Man into Superman, supra note 2.
6. Id.; Rosenfeld, The New Man, supra note 2; Baby in a Bottle, supra note 2.
7. See articles cited note 6 supra; Test Tube Tempest, supra note 2.
8. Rosenfeld, The New Man, supra note 2.
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of the threat of criminal prosecution, Petrucci abandoned his work in
ectogenesis. 9
If Dr. Petrucci's case were to occur today in the United States,
what criminal law issues would be involved? Could the genetic re-
searcher be indicted for murder? For manslaughter? Is the "termina-
tion" of an in vitro fetus feticide in .the context of Anglo-American law?
Does the state have a compelling interest in the protection of fetal life?
The Petrucci case was not an isolated incident. He was not the
first, or the last, scientist to attempt Promethean research; nor was he
the last to feel the social, religious, and legal pressures incident to that
research. Dr. John Rock of Harvard made the first successful fertiliza-
tion of a human egg in vitro in 1944,10 but none of Dr. Rock's test-
tube embryos grew beyond the three-cell stage." Then, beginning in
the early 1950's and continuing until the present, Dr. Landrum B. Shet-
tles of Columbia University has conducted ectogenetic research. He
has succeeded in maintaining embryos for six days to the blastocyst
stage of development (34 cells and up). 2 In 1954, when Dr. Shettles
attended the International Fertility Conference in Italy, he found him-
self being criticized by Pope Pius XII who condemned those who "take
the Lord's work into their own hands."'" In Great Britain, Dr. R.G.
Edwards of Cambridge succeeded in human test-tube fertilization and
embryonic growth in a laboratory culture in the late 1960's.14 Nature,
in response to the work of Dr. Edwards and the adverse public opinion
incident thereto, published the following:
[A] correspondent in The Times voiced the fear that: "The
ability of scientists to develop the technique of creating life
in a test-tube is so serious that I feel human beings should
be given the opportunity to express their views on whether
or not this line of research should be pursued ....
[sic] Personally I find the idea of creating life at man's will
terrifying." . . . [Tjhose who are engaged in research that
is at all liable to be misinterpreted will doubtless take the
present episode as a warning of the misunderstandings that
can arise, particularly if the true facts are not readily available
from authoritative sources. There is always the danger that
9. Id.; Man into Superman, supra note 2.
10. Rorvik, The Test-Tube Baby is Coming, LOOK 83 (May 18, 1971); Smith,
Through a Test Tube Darkly, supra note 2.
11. Rorvik, Test-Tube Baby, supra note 10.
12. Id.; Man into Superman, supra note 2, at 38.
13. Rorvik, Test-Tube Baby, supra note 10, at 84.
14. Kass, New Beginnings in Life, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF
MAN 22 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972); New York Times, Feb. 15, 1969, at 31, col. 7.
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lack of information or misinformation may convert legitimate
public concern about new knowledge into a paranoia that im-
pedes research.15
In an article on ectogenetic research, the New York Times quoted Dr.
Donald Gould, the editor of The New Scientist:
What happens to the embroyos which are discarded at the
end of the day-washed down the sink? There would nec-
essarily be many. Would this amount to abortion-or to
murder? We have no law to cope with this kind of situa-
tion. 6
Martin P. Golding, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University,
stated, "It is possible that the discipline of genetics will be unable to
police itself and that legal sanctions will be necessary to deter what the
public. . . regards as abuses."' Perhaps the strongest (at least a very
authoritative) statement concerning eotogenetic research came from Dr.
James D. Watson, The Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist. While
testifying before a House sub-committee on science, he urged the es-
tablishment of a comission to study the ramifications of fertilization and
gestation in vitro, and he asked Congress to consider legislation pro-
hibiting all research involving human embryos.18
It should be clear that the subject of this comment does not concern
itself with the mere speculation or wild hypotheticals, nor is it prema-
ture in raising the legal issues herein. Albert Rosenfeld, in his book
The Second Genesis: The Coming Control of Life, quoted an anony-
mous American scientist, "If I can carry a baby all the way through
to birth in vitro, I certainly plan to do it-though obviously, I am not
going to succeed on the first attempt, or even the twentieth."' 9  Dr.
Bentley Glass, past-president of the American Association of Advance-
ment of Science, has predicted that before the year 2000, human ecto-
genesis from conception to decantation' will be achieved."' The law
must confront, identify, and resolve the legal dilemmas born of -this
brave new world.
15. Premature Birth of Test Tube Baby, 225 NATURE 886 (1970), quoted in Kass,
New Beginnings in Life, supra note 14, at 58.
16. Kass, New Beginnings in Life, supra note 14, at 33.
17. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 443,
478 (1968).
18. Man into Superman, supra note 2; Rorvik, Test-Tube Baby, supra note 10, at
88; Robinson, Genetics and Society, 1971 UTAH LAW REV. 487, 492 (Winter, 1971).
19. A. ROSENFELD, THE SECOND GENEsis: THE COMING CONTROL OF LIwE 117
(1969), quoted in Kass, New Beginnings in Life, supra note 14, at 24.
20. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEw WORLD (1st ed. 1932).
21. Rorvik, Test-Tube Baby, supra note 10.
1974]
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BACKGROUND
Ectogenesis is 'but one facet of eugenics, the science which deals
with the improvement of genetic qualities.2 2  The science of eugenics
can be applied either negatively or positively. Negative eugenics is
the science devoted to the diminution of inferior genetic qualities.23
Positive eugenics is the science devoted to the propagation of superior
genetic qualities.24 Positive and negative eugenics, and biological en-
gineering 25 in general, have been the subject of much discussion in law
review circles. Although this comment will focus on the criminal law
aspects of ectogenetic research, it would be well to establish the context
of this comment by reviewing the general -topic of biological engineer-
ing.
A host of legal and moral questions have been raised by the giant
advances in biological engineering; the following issues are merely a
sample of the questions considered in legal and popular sources. One
area of controversy has been the growing practice of organ transplants.
The medical problem of obtaining the donor's organs as promptly as
possible upon his death is a crucial one due to the rapid deterioration
of most organs. This medical problem has in turn raised a crucial legal
problem. May a doctor remove a'vital organ from a person on the verge
of death, so as to prevent even the possibility of deterioration? If he
did, could he be indicted for murder?26 The risk of criminal prosecu-
tion in such a case has created interest in legislation to redefine the
moment of death. Cryonic suspension, the suspended animation of
individuals through the use of very low temperatures, 2 has also been
the subject of legal debate. Since "freezing kills" by today's standards,
could freezing an individual 'before his death be construed as murder?209
Legal commentators have considered the issues raised by the advent
22. Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social
Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 189 (1971).
23. Id.; Pauling, Foreword to Reflections on the New Biology, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
267, 271 (1968).
24. See articles cited notes 22 and 23 supra.
25. Biological engineering refers to those techniques acquired from research done
in the biological sciences which are utilized to produce changes in an individual's
genotype (the genetic characteristics) or phenotype (the visible characteristics). Gold-
ing, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, supra note 17, at 451.
26. See For the Record, 15 U.C.L.A.L. RnLv. vii (1968).
27. Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 480, 500 (1968).
28. Spector, Legal Implications of Cryonics, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rpy. 341, 356
(1969).
29. See id.
[Vol. 10:243
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of cyborgs, a biologically engineered hybrid between man and machine
manufactured through the coupling of human brain tissue with elec-
tronic units.30 Two areas of biological engineering that have been the
source of legal discussion are parthenogenesis and cloning. Partheno-
genesis is the reproduction of an individual from an unfertilized egg,
which is induced to begin formation of an embryo through the prick
of a pin or 'by cooling the ovum at a particular stage in its maturation.31
An individual produced by parthenogenesis would always be the same
sex as its sole parent, but it would not be the twin of its parent.32 An
asexually produced individual that is the exact copy of its parent is a
clone.33 Biological engineers have also begun the task of human gene-
tic mapping, the identification and location of each gene along ,the forty-
six human chromosomes.34 It is hoped that this deciphering of the
genetic code will be completed within a few decades. 35 A great deal
of legal reflection has been focused on embryo transplantation.36 Dr.
Landrum Shettles has already performed an embryo transplant; he fer-
tilized, in vitro, the egg of one woman with the sperm of her husband
and then implanted it within a second woman.3 7 Two days later, a pre-
viously scheduled hysterectomy was performed on the second woman;
the embryo was located and examined in the excised uterus where it
had successfully embedded itself.3 8 If a transplanted embryo were car-
ried to term, who would be the parents of the child, the egg and sperm
contributors or the woman who carried the child to term and her hus-
band?3" The issues raised by the embryo transplants are very similar
to the legal questions surrounding A.I.D., artificial insemination by
donor. A child conceived by A.I.D. would, of course, be the child of
its mother, but it would not be the genetic offspring of her 'husband.40
Should the marriage ever end in divorce, a number of problems could
develop. The mother may attempt to deny her former husband visita-
tion rights on the grounds of non-paternity; conversely, the former hus-
band may assert his non-paternity as a defense to any claim for child
30. Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 273,
357 (1968).
31. Id. at 282-83.
32. Id. at 283.
33. Id. at 300.
34. Id. at 288-91.
35. Id. at 288.
36. See Grad, Legislative Responses, supra note 27, at 502.
37. Rorvik, Test-Tube Baby, supra note 10, at 83, 86.
38. Id.
39. Grad, Legislative Responses, supra note 27, at 502.
40. Id.
1974]
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support.41  Is the former husband the child's father?42  Is the child il-
legitimate?4 Is the child the issue of the former husband with regard
to intestate succession?44  Is the mother guilty of adultery? 4 , Is the
physician who performed the artificial insemination guilty of battery? 40
The legal ambiguities generated by A.I.D. and the legal questions
raised by biological engineering in general mirror the legal problems
encountered in ectogenetic research. Just as the "old" definitions of
father, legitimacy, issue, adultery, and battery are inapplicable in a case
involving A.I.D., so it is in a case of ectogenetic research with quick
child, feticide, infanticide, viability, and murder. This comment will
attempt ,to resolve the legal ambiguities that may confront an ectogenet-
ic researcher.
CRIMINAL LAW AMBIGUITIES
By definition, ectogenesis involves the deliberate fertilization of
a human egg, and in the course of everyday laboratory work, it neces-
sarily involves the ",termination" of fertilized eggs. The "termination"
may occur a few moments after conception or 59 days thereafter. 17 It
may occur volitionally, by mistake, or by negligence, but if this work
continues (and it surely will) a great many embryos will be destroyed.
The destruction of human offspring is prolicide. 8 Prolicide is divided
into two subjects, feticide and infanticide. 49
Feticide has been defined as the destruction of the fetus, whether
in utero or in vitro; the act by which criminal abortion is producedY0
It is known that the ancient Persians had knowledge of abortifacients
but considered their use to be a highly criminal act subject to severe
41. Id. at 504, 507; Grad, New Beginnings in Life-A Lawyer's Response, in
THE NEW GENETCS AND THE FuTuRE oF MAN 72 (M. Hamilton ed. 1972); Gomey,
The New Biology, supra note 30, at 279; Rosenfeld, The New Man, supra note 2, at
96.
42. See articles cited note 41 supra.
43. Vukowich, Brave New World, supra note 22, at 223; Grad, Legislative Re-
sponses, supra note 27, at 503; Rosenfeld, The New Man, supra note 2, at 96.
44. Vukowich, Brave New World, supra note 22, at 223; Gorney, The New Biology,
supra note 30, at 279; Grad, Legislative Responses, supra note 27, at 507; Rosenfeld,
The New Man, supra note 2, at 96.
45. Grad, A Lawyers Response, supra note 41, at 73; Vukowich, Brave New
World, supra note 22, at 223; Grad, Legislative Responses, supra note 27, at 504.
46. Grad, Legislative Responses, supra note 27, at 503-04; Rosenfeld, The New
Man, supra note 2, at 96.
47. See note 4 supra.
48. BLAcK's LAW DICnTONARY 1378 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
49. Id.
50. Id.; Grad, A Lawyer's Response, supra note 41, at 65-66.
[Vol. 10:243
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punishment." ' By the time of the Greeks, however, feticide was prac-
ticed without penalty or dishonor; the same being true of the Romans.5"
The common law followed the precedent set by the Greeks and Ro-
mans, up to that stage of pregnancy when the embryo became
"quick. ' '53 A "quick" child was distinguished at the first uterine move-
ment of the fetus."' The distinction of "quickness" was an important
one under the common law, for it determined the nature of the abortion
act. Prior to "quickening," the fetus was considered a part of its
mother and no crime resulted with its destruction."5 After "quicken-
ing," however, feticide did result from the abortion act. As Lord Coke
stated:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a Potion or
otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of
a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and no murder
56
Lord Coke defined a misprison as the commission of a heinous offence
under the degree of a felony." Blackstone considered a misprison to
be a high offense, not of the degree of a capital crime, but one border-
ing thereon. 8 A misprison was not a misdemeanor, in the modem
sense, as some commentators have suggested; 59 for misprisons fre-
quently involved punishments of life imprisonment and the forfeiture
of all lands held by the criminal party. 60
Blackstone explained that before any degree of homicide could
occur, there had to be a person, a "reasonable creature in being," to
be the subject of a homicide, and a fetus, whether "quick" or not, had
never met that criteria. 6 It is clear that the common law looked with
disfavor upon the destruction of the "quick" fetus; synchronously,
however, it did not accord even the "quick" fetus the status of a human
being, '- and apparently afforded no status whatsoever the pre-"quick"
51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 132-33.
54. Id. at 132.
55. Id.
56. 3 E. CoKE, INsTrrUTEs 50.
57. Id. at 139.
58. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES 119.
59. R. PERKINS, C-'mNAL LAW 140 (2nd ed. 1969).
60. 3 E. COKE, INSTrruTEs 140, 141. Note, however, that a misprison did not
destroy the right of the criminal party's heirs to the inheritance of land, since being
no felony, corruption of blood did not occur. Id.
61. 4 W. BLAcKS'rONE, COMmENTAEIms 197-98.
62. Id.
1974]
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fetus. Were the common law to rule today in -the case of a "terminated"
ectogenetic embryo, no crime of any degree would be involved, since
no ectogenetic embryo to date has exhibited any movement within its
glass womb. (This defense will, 'however, crumble before on-going
research which will, sooner or later, produce a fetus that has "quick-
ened.") But, how would American statutory law and case law view
the "termination" of an ectogenetic fetus?
In American jurisprudence, the initial feticide statutes continued
the English distinction of "quickness," dealing harshly with feticide af-
ter "quickening" and being lenient with feticide before "quickening.""
Beginning in the middle 1800's, however, the "quickness" distinction
began to disappear from the statutory law of most states, and the degree
of the offense and the penalties attached thereto were made more se-
vere. 64 Some states even classified feticide as a homicide, man-
slaughter.6 5 The statutory trend was also reflected in the case law. In
the 1850 case of Mills v. Commonwealth,6 the Pennsylvania court held
that "quickness" was not a necessary element in the crime of abortion:
[Feticide] interferes with and violates tame mysteries of na-
ture in that process by which the human race is propagated
and continued. It is a crime against nature which obstructs
the fountain of life, and therefore it is punished. . . . The
moment the womb is instinct with embryo life, and gestation
has begun, the crime may be perpetrated.67
Almost one-hundred years later, in the case of Hall v. People,8 the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that the crime of feticide occurred with
the destruction of the fetus at anytime before birth. A similar holding
was reached by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in the case of Hans
v. State: 9
While arbitrary distinction is made by some writers between
"foetus ' 70 and "embryo", 71 the distinction is not recognized
63. 410 U.S. at 139.
64. Id.
65. PEmRms, C'imin LAw, supra note 59, at 29; Gilpin v. Gilpin, 94 N.Y.S.2d
706, 708 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
66. 13 Pa. (1 Harris) 631 (1850).
67. Id. at 633.
68. 201 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1948).
69. 22 N.W.2d 385 (Neb. 1946).
70. The unborn young of a viviparous animal, after it has taken form in the
uterus; in man, the product of conception from the end of the eighth week to the
moment of birth. STmAP's MEDICAL DICIoNARY 461 (3rd ed. 1972).
71. An organism in early stages of development; in man, from conception until
approximately the end of the second month. Id. at 404.
[Vol. 10:243
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in a charge of "foeticide". We make reference to the follow-
ing legal definitions: "Foetus. In medical jurisprudence.
An unborn child. An infant in ventre sa mere." Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 794.
It is clear that the arbitrary and technical distinction between
the terms "embryo" and "foetus" are not recognized by the
law. The terms are practically interchangeable and refer to
an unborn child, in ventre sa mere. It is obvious the Legis-
lature used these terms in their ordinary and commonly ac-
cepted meaning, and when it used the term "foeticide" it
meant the unlawful destruction of an unborn child, in ventre
sa mere, at any stage of gestation.72
With the concept of "quickness" having been completely abandoned,
a charge of feticide would stand for the destruction of a fetus or an
embryo. Under this approach, the "termination" of an ectogenetic em-
bryo would seem to be feticide. The only possible loophole being the
qualifying phrase, in ventre sa mere, in the mother's womb. 73 An ecto-
genetic embryo has a womb, albeit glass, but what of the mother?
The American law of feticide, as formulated in statutory and case
law dating from the middle 1800's, was abrogated by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.74 The Court held unconstitu-
tional the feticide statutes proscribing abortion at any stage of gestation.
Basing its decision on the mother's right to privacy, the Court explained
that the statutes, in restricting a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7"
The Court acknowledged, however, that the mother's right to terminate
her pregnancy was not an unqualified right;70 the decision differentiat-
ing the extent of this right during the three gestational trimesters. The
decision to terminate the fetus during the first trimester must be solely
that of the mother and her doctor.77  During the second trimester, a
state may regulate the abortion procedure only to insure maternal
health. 78  During the final trimester of gestation, a state may protect
fetal life by prohibiting feticide, except where it is necessary to preserve
72. 22 N.W.2d 385, 388-89 (Neb. 1946).
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
74. 410 U.S. at 113.
75. Id. at 154, 164.
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id. at 164.
7 . 14,
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the health of the mother.79  With the decision in Roe v. Wade, the
law of feticide has come full circle, for the protection the Supreme
Court afforded a third trimester fetus is analogous to the protection the
common law of Lord Coke afforded a "quick" child. There is no crime
of any degree for the destruction of a fetus prior to the third trimester,
just as there was no crime of any degree for the destruction of a fetus
prior to "quickening." As a result of the Roe decision, the "termina-
tion" of an ectogenetic embryo clearly could not be feticide; no ecto-
genetic embryo to date having developed to the third trimester.80
Infanticide has been defined as the killing of an infant after its
birth;8' the felonious taking of the life of a newborn child, which consti-
tutes murder."2  Lord Coke said, "[-f the childe be borne alive, and
dieth of the Potion, battery or other cause, this is murder: for in law
it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born
alive."8 3 The crucial element in a case of infanticide is the birth of
the child. As was stated in the case of Gilpin v. Gilpin:8 4
It [the birth of the child] determines the distinction be-
tween the crimes of foeticide and infanticide. The former,
the destruction of the life of the foetus; infanticide, the fel-
onious taking of the life of a newborn child. The killing of
a foetus in utero, is manslaughter; the killing of a child after
its birth is murder. 85
Determining exactly what constitutes the birth of a child has, however,
been something of a problem. Professor Perkins in his text on criminal
law has stated: "[Tihe infant must be fully expelled from the body
of the mother and have established a separate circulation. It must live
apart from the body and circulation of the mother. ... 80 (Empha-
sis added.) Precisely defining infanticide and accurately identifying
the elements of that crime have great significance when contemplating
the criminal nature, if any, of the "termination" of an ectogenetic em-
bryo, for an ectogenetic child begins life apart from the body and circu-
lation of the mother. Yet, it cannot be said that the ectogenetic embryo
79. Id.; See p. 18 infra for further discussion of permissible state regulation during
the third trimester.
80. Presumably, however, future research will develop an ectogenetic fetus to the
third trimester of development, the "termination" of which would constitute feticide
in a state regulating third trimester abortions.
81. BLACK'S LAW DicTiONARY 917 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
82. Gilpin v. Gilpin, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
83. 3 E. CoKn, INsTTruTEs 50.
84. Gilpin v. Gilpin, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706, 708 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950).
85. Id. at 708.
86. PERmINs, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 59, at 29.
[Vol. 10:243
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has, to echo Lord Coke, been "born alive." The "birth" of an ecto-
genetic fetus, decantation,8 7 may someday be accomplished, but today
there is simply no "birth" in any sense of the word. Nevertheless, the
ectogenetic fetus is living apart from the body and circulation of the
mother; in this sense it is somewhat analogous to a viable child.
A viable child has been defined as a fetus that is capable of an
existence independent of the mother.88 It is traditionally thought that
viability occurs between the sixth and seventh month after conception, 9
and that an embryo (a fetus in its earliest stages of development) could
never be considered a viable child.9  In the case of an ectogenetic
embryo, however, viability occurs at conception. It not only is capable
of an independent existence; it maintains an independent existence,
yet, like the viable child, it is still a fetus because it has never been
"born alive". The viability analogy is tremendously important due to
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe.91 The Court held that the state's
police power could include a compelling interest in the protection of
fetal life at the stage of viability, such that the state could regulate
and even proscribe the destruction of a fetus at that stage. 2 But, do
the states need to formulate legislation to protect an ectogenetic fetus
that, due to its independent existence, may already be the subject of
infanticide?
Is the "termination" of an ectogenetic embryo feticide, infanticide,
or criminal in any respect, whatsoever? The ambiguities remain.
LEGISLATIVE DEMARCATION
The legal quesitons raised by ectogenetic research could be easily
resolved by appropriate legislation. Legislation has already been
passed incident to another area of eugenics, A.I.D.93 The difficult
questions in a case involving A.I.D. concerning the legal definition of
father, legitimacy, issue, adultery, and battery, were answered on May
12, 1967, when the Oklahoma legislature passed the first statute in the
87. HUXLEy, BRAVE NEW WORLD, supra note 20.
88. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Ia. 1960); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Ky.
1955); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225, 225 (Or. 1955).
89. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Ia. 1960); Mitchell v. Couch 285
S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky. 1955).
90. See cases cited note 89 supra.
91. 410 U.S. at 113.
92. Id. at 163-65.
93. See p. 8-9 supra.
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United States authorizing the use of A.I.DY4 The statute defines the
father of the child as the husband of the mother, the child as the legiti-
mate issue of the couple, and removes the possibility of accusations of
adultery or battery. 5 The Oklahoma legislation expressly sanctioning
one legally troublesome eugenic program serves as a precedent for leg-
islation pertaining to another, ectogenesis. Legalizing all facets of ec-
togenetic research would prevent scientists from ever experiencing the
nightmare Dr. Petrucci suffered. 6 But there is also a compelling state
interest in passing such legislation.
In the past, mankind has been subject to the laws of natural selec-
tion and survival of the fittest; the weak and genetically defective suc-
cumbing to natural forces. Today, however, medical science and tech-
nology have succeeded in frustrating natural selection by prolonging to
the age of reproduction many individuals carrying deleterious genes-
individuals who then transmit their genetic defects to future genera-
tions.97  This circumvention of natural selection has resulted in greatly
increasing humanity's genetic load, the total number of genetic defects
in society. a8 Geneticists have estimated that today every individual car-
ries between five and ten potentially harmful genes.9 In the 1968
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
Robert L. Sinsheimer, biophysicist at the California Institute of Tech-
nology, stated that 250,000 children are born annually with structural
or functional defects and that four-fifths of such births involve a genetic
component. 100 Consider the remarks of Sir Julian Huxley:
[I]f we don't do something about controlling our genetic in-
heritance, we are going to degenerate. Without selection,
bad mutations inevitably tend to accumulate; . . . . Most
mutations are deleterious, ,but we now keep many of them
going that would otherwise have died out. If this continues
indefinitely. . . then the whole genetic capacity of man will
be much weakened. 10 1
The human race will continue even if its genetic load doubles or even
94. O LA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (1967); Grad, A Lawyer's Response, supra note
41, at 71-72; Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly, supra note 2, at 144.
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (1967); see articles cited note 94 supra.
96. See p. 1-2 supra.
97. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, supra note 17, at 444.
98. Vukowich, Brave New World, supra note 22 at 192.
99. Man into Superman, supra note 2, at 37.
100. Noted in Little, Statistical Morality, Law and Tomorrow's World, 21 U. FLA.
L. R v. 442, 446 n.8 (1969).
101. Quoted in Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, supra note 17, at
453.
[Vol. 10:243
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss2/4
ECTOGENETIC RESEARCH
triples, but it would mean an existence of ever increasing medical de-
pendency. 10 2 It has been stated that life totally dependent on constant
medical attention would become more of a treatment than a treat.1
03
To prevent man from becoming so genetically weak as to be constantly
dependent on medical maintenance, intervention through the science
of eugenics is essential.104  Eugenic research must be allowed the un-
fettered opportunity to develop the means to insure mankind a better
tomorrow. Ectogenesis is an important facet of that research. How-
ever, no other area of eugenic research is so fraught with ithe pressures
of legal uncertainty as ectogenesis. Legislation protecting the ecto-
genetic researcher from any fear of criminal prosecution would permit
the unworried continuance of this necessary research; research vital to
any state concerned with the health of its present and future citizens.
CONCLUSION
Mankind stands uncertainly at the door of a biological revolution.
Ectogenesis can help humanity pass through that door and pursue its
promising future awaiting behind it. The law, however, not science,
will be chiefly responsible for the decision to encourage or to hinder
mankind's challenges of the future, for the law will authorize or restrain
scientific research necessary for that venture. Unrestricted scientific re-
search must be allowed, for if law or the threat of law immobilizes
science, the future of mankind is not promising but dismal. The law
must work with and promote science and scientific research to insure
mankind an auspicious tomorrow.' 5
102. Gorney, The New Biology, supra note 30, at 292.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 292-93.
105. See Schroeder, The Inlluence of Medical and Biological Progress on the Crim-
inal Lim, 9 MEDIcINE, Sci. L. 137, 160 (1969).
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